Tax the rich? Taxation as a way to discourage regulations
Abstract
Economic regulation is a way for interest groups to gain rent by reducing competition. However, regulations are often understood as anti-signatures. This is due to a lack of economic knowledge combined with an inability to process information about the real costs of average regulations on the part of the citizen. As a result, we often find ourselves in a dynamic where the real motivation behind regulations is rarely recognized and, in this way, interest groups benefit by not paying their costs. Traditional methods of dealing with regulatory quality are not working. Therefore, this article proposes a way to address this problem: to put the cost of regulation where the benefits are, i.e., on the industry or other stakeholders that are the main beneficiaries of the regulation, and to analyze the elements of the proposed regulation from an ius-economic approach and study case studies related to the situation of Peruvian universities. This is done through a descriptive, legal-theoretical, and economic methodology based on a review of contemporary literature. Finally, consider the creation of a tax for the interest groups that benefit from the regulations. While this idea is not new, it has not yet been implemented or described operationally. This commentary is an effort to bring this idea into academic and public debate.
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